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ABSTRACT 
The loss of pilot airplane state awareness (ASA) has been implicated as a factor in several 
aviation accidents identified by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST). These accidents 
were investigated to identify precursors to the loss of ASA and develop technologies to address 
the loss of ASA. Based on a gap analysis, two technologies were prototyped and assessed with 
a formative pilot-in-the-loop evaluation in NASA Langley’s full-motion Research Flight Deck. The 
technologies address: 1) data source anomaly detection in real-time, and 2) intelligent 
monitoring aids to provide nominal and predictive awareness of situations to be monitored and a 
mission timeline to visualize events of interest. The evaluation results indicated favorable 
impressions of both technologies for mitigating the loss of ASA in terms of operational utility, 
workload, acceptability, complexity, and usability. The team concludes that there is a feasible 
retrofit solution for improving ASA that would minimize certification risk, integration costs, and 
training impact.
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Introduction 
Under NASA’s Airspace Operations and Safety Program (AOSP), Honeywell is developing advanced 
technologies to address loss of airplane state awareness (ASA) by pilot. First, the team reviewed past 
accidents and incidents to identify situations and precursors to situations where pilots constructed 
inaccurate or incomplete ASA. These included events identified by Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
(CAST) (CAST 2014a; CAST, 2014b), as well as 24 loss of awareness events between January 2007 and 
January 2016 identified by the Honeywell team.  Next, the team cataloged information support for these 
situations as provided by modern commercial flight decks. Based on these analyses, the team then 
generated conceptual designs for technologies that may help to improve airplane system state 
awareness. These were refined through feedback session with Honeywell pilots and system engineers 
(Whitlow et al., 2017). 
We have employed a design philosophy that ASA should be seamlessly integrated into legacy displays 
that support aviate and manage systems tasks. These displays command the lion-share of flight crew 
attention. Continuously and explicitly conveying ASA with these displays is the most cognitively efficient 
means and should not only enhance ASA in normal situations, but also will facilitate safe operation 
during non-normal situations by co-locating ASA elements with primary flight displays. 
Conceptual designs have been developed that we believe will address the following research aims 
related to the broader goals of this class of technologies: 
• Eliminate the opaque wall between crew and automation
• Improve the crew’s ability to recognize and respond to non-normal situations that
accommodate inherent attention and monitoring limitations
In Year 2 of the effort, we conducted a pilot-in-the-loop (PITL) formative evaluation in Honeywell’s 
Redmond B737-NG Simulator to demonstrate prototypes in a simulated flight environment and to elicit 
initial pilot feedback on the usability and acceptability of the designs. This was to ensure we are 
pursuing a fruitful path and assess whether the design would have lower certifiability risk and could be 
implemented in a cost-effective manner. 
We found that pilots rated both technology interventions favorably in terms of subjective workload, 
acceptability, complexity, and usability. In addition, pilots provided many suggestions to improve the 
designs and expand the functionality. Most importantly, pilots were supportive of an integrated solution 
that would include a simpler indication on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) while maintaining the 
valuable information content on the Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System (EICAS) display. This 
would better conform to display conventions while reducing certification risk. 
Accordingly, we matured the conceptual designs for the present evaluation in the NASA Langley Cockpit 
Motion Facility’s Research Flight Deck.  The work reported here is related to previously reported 
evaluations conducted at NASA (Young et al., 2016a; Young et al., 2016b). 
Technology Description 
During this phase, we integrated two related, synergistic technology concepts to better support pilots 
maintaining awareness of airplane states. Both technologies are based on intelligent modules that 
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analyze and reason on the state of aircraft and mission as it relates to monitoring requirements. While 
these technologies were evaluated separately in Year 2, based on the Honeywell evaluation feedback, 
we integrated the two technologies to operate synergistically. 
The Input Data Anomaly Detection (IDAD) technology identifies when data critical to pilot awareness 
and/or autoflight function is likely anomalous.  The Status Widget & Support Suite of Tools (SW/SSOT) 
that provides a timeline indication on EICAS to enable the pilot monitoring (PM) to quickly assess the 
state of monitoring requirements. The SW provides high-level symbology, while the SSOT provides 
lower-level details that pilots may optionally 'pull-up' to explain SW indications.  This includes relevant 
information to explain events depicted in the SW and support pilot decision making. 
IDAD 
The intended function of the IDAD technology is to identify when data critical to pilot awareness and 
autoflight function is likely anomalous, for example in the case of a frozen pitot tube, and then notify 
the crew per the needs of the situation. This can serve to augment existing voting methods with robust 
statistical and analytic methods with respect to how flight critical input data sources are validated. This 
involves developing a statistical model of sensor input to evaluate whether current values deviate or are 
trending toward a deviation. If a deviation is detected, then the system executes decision logic to 
determine which actions or notifications the system should make for the observed anomaly. 
In addition to detection, the module is intended to be diagnostic in that it can identify the most likely 
anomalous parameter to help pilots understand which information source is reliable and which is not. 
Consideration will include several factors (e.g., whether the parameter is in use; whether there is a flight 
path impact), to determine the appropriate response. Based on incident analysis and pilot reviews, an 
important function of response to anomalies is to prevent a “first bad move” by pilots, possibly 
exacerbated by startle/surprise response to erroneously presented information. 
Predicting Anomalies 
In addition to detecting data anomalies that are not currently monitored, the IDAD technology also 
addresses startle/surprise by predicting when data anomalies may occur. Based on the data analytic 
approach used to determine when a data point is anomalous, under certain situations it is possible to 
observe data points over time and predict when an anomaly may occur based on a trend. 
For a given sensor or metric, a threshold is established to distinguish typical expected values from 
atypical unexpected values (i.e., anomalous values). If this threshold is crossed, an anomaly is said to be 
happening at present (“current anomaly”). Before this happens, if the observed values are trending 
toward an anomaly, prediction is performed to estimate when the threshold will be crossed in the 
future. For the version tested, the timing of the predicted anomaly is calculated via a linear 
extrapolation. The figure below provides an example of how anomalies are predicted. As the observed 
values (represented as blue dots) approach the anomaly threshold for this metric (standard deviation of 
airspeed), a prediction is calculated (represented as yellow line). By calculating where the prediction line 
will cross the anomaly threshold, we estimate how far in the future that is from the present. 
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Figure 1. Example of anomaly trend detection of airspeed. 
This calculation is performed repeatedly to update the prediction as changes occur in the observed 
values. 
SW/SSOT 
The Status Widget (SW) provides a timeline display to enable the crew to quickly assess the current and 
future state of monitoring requirements. The SW provides a visual “at a glance” indication conveying 
both urgency and criticality of monitoring tasks. The SW depicts both expected events, like upcoming 
checklists and the Top of Descent (T/D), as well as unexpected events such as current and predicted 
input data anomalies. The SW is interactive, allowing the crew to open the SSOT window for more 
detailed information about active events, then close the SSOT at their discretion. Events are graphically 
depicted along a fixed 15-minute timeline and move toward the "now" line as time passes. The timeline 
includes a "now" time gutter that catches active events to make them persistent to enhance crew 
awareness once they pass the "now" timeline, to prevent them from being missed. Likewise, there is "> 
15 minute" time gutter to represent events beyond the fixed 15-minute time horizon. 
4 
Figure 2. Annotated example of Status Widget with an expected event (Checklist) and unexpected event (anomaly). 
The Support Suite of Tools (SSOT) presents relevant information to help the crew understand the active 
events and support their decision making. Information content for expected events varies by the type of 
event, but all include an estimate when the expected event is "due". For example, a pending Gate 
Report event could include the appropriate telephone number and a pending checklist could include 
checklist items. The color coding of the both the SW and SSOT should conform to flight deck 
conventions.  
Figure 3. Example of Status Widget and Support Suite of Tools together. The SSOT provides additional information about the 
expected (descent checklist) and unexpected (pitch anomaly) events. 
Design Philosophy 
During the initial evaluation at Honeywell facility, pilot feedback indicated a preference for four types of 
information following an anomaly: 
• What is wrong?
• What is impacted?
• Which source is good?
• What should the pilot do (guidance)?
Accordingly, we modified the design of the IDAD and SW/SSOT technologies to incorporate this 
information. Pilots also suggested that anomalous information should be removed from the display. 
Based on these observations, the system was modified to perform the following actions following 
detection of a data anomaly: 
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1. Remove Anomalous Data from Impacted PFD(s) and Display Flag
The system removes anomalous data from impacted PFD(s) to improve crew diagnosis of ongoing 
anomalous autoflight behavior. Prior to being removed from the display, the anomalous data flashes for 
10 seconds before a red flag appears near the anomalous data (e.g., SPD ANOM). The formatting and 
location of the red flag accommodates location of legacy PFD Failure flags.  
The removal of anomalous content on the PFD worked as follows for the types of anomalies tested 
during flight simulations: 
• Airspeed: airspeed tape elements removed: digits, increments, and indications
• Pitch: all Attitude Display components, horizon removed
• RA: radar altimeter indication removed
2. Display Explanation in Status Widget/Support Suite of Tools
Brief, explanatory information is displayed in the SW/SSOT to help the crew understand the impact of 
the data anomaly on autoflight systems (e.g., autopilot disconnect), identify which data source is 
anomalous, and if possible to predict when the anomaly could occur. This is detailed in the SW/SSOT 
section below. 
3. Display EICAS Message
An EICAS message is displayed to harmonize with existing EICAS alerting philosophy. 
Alerting philosophy 
Trending toward an Anomaly 
If the anomaly is initially detected as a trend, amber caution messages and the EICAS aural beeper tone 
(4 beeps) are used. Specifically, the SW depicts an amber icon on the timeline with a projection of when 
the system believes the anomaly will manifest, the SSOT indicates which source is anomalous and which 
autoflight systems may be impacted, and the corresponding amber EICAS caution message appears. 
Current Anomaly 
If the anomaly is detected at present, red warning messages and the Master Warning aural tone are 
used. Specifically, the SW depicts a red icon on the timeline at Time 0, indicating that the anomaly is 
happening at present, the SSOT indicates which source is anomalous, which autoflight systems are 
impacted, and provides guidance, and the corresponding red EICAS warning message appears. 
Example Images 
Figures 4-7 depict examples of the PFD and MFD as implemented for the NASA flight simulator 
evaluation. In Figure 4 there are no IDAD/SW/SSOT indications; this is considered the 'baseline'. Figures 
5-7 depict the PFD and MFD for airspeed, pitch, and radar altimeter anomalies, respectively. These 
images are for the affected side being fed by anomalous data, as the display elements are not changed 
for the unaffected side.
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Figure 4. Baseline PFD and MFD for the left side displays. 
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IDAD detection of an airspeed anomaly triggers the following: 1) airspeed tape elements are removed from the PFD and an anomaly flag is added 
(“SPD ANOM”), 2) SW displays a red anomaly icon indicating that the issue is happening at present, 3) explanatory information is provided in the 
SSOT indicating that the ADRS1 source is anomalous, autopilot and autothrottle will disconnect, and other airspeed sources should be considered.  
EICAS indicates that an ADRS1 airspeed anomaly has occurred. 
Figure 5. PFD and MFD during an airspeed anomaly. 
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IDAD detection of a pitch anomaly triggers the following: 1) Attitude Display elements and horizon are removed from the PFD and an anomaly flag is 
added (“PIT ANOM”), 2) SW displays a red anomaly icon indicating that the issue is happening at present, 3) explanatory information is provided in 
the SSOT indicating that the IRS1 source is anomalous, autopilot will disconnect, and other pitch sources should be considered. EICAS indicates that 
an IRS1 pitch anomaly has occurred. 
Figure 6. PFD and MFD during a pitch anomaly. 
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IDAD detection of a radar altimeter anomaly triggers the following: 1) Radar altimeter is removed from the PFD an anomaly flag is added (“RA 
ANOM”), 2) SW displays a red anomaly icon indicating that the issue is happening at present, 3) explanatory information is provided in the SSOT 
indicating that the RA1 source is anomalous and that other RA sources should be considered. Additionally, the EICAS indicates that an RA1 anomaly 
has occurred. 
Figure 7. PFD and MFD during a radar altimeter anomaly. 
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Information content for each anomaly type is summarized in Table 1. 
Anomaly Notification 
Information Content: 
Airspeed 
Anomaly 
Pitch 
Anomaly 
Radar Altimeter 
Anomaly 
What is wrong? ADRS1 SPD ANOM IRS1 PIT ANOM RA1 ANOM 
What is impacted? AP/AT DISC AP DISC -- 
Which source is good? Other (Not ADRS1) Other (Not IRS1) Other (Not RA1) 
What should pilot do (guidance)? 
Consider Other SPD 
SOURCES 
Consider Other PIT 
SOURCES 
Consider Other 
RASOURCES 
Table 1. Anomaly notification information content. 
Transitioning from Predicted Anomaly to Current Anomaly 
As discussed above, anomalous sensor behavior can be detected before crossing a threshold deemed to 
be anomalous. In such cases, the system can predict how much time it will take for the anomaly to reach 
the threshold. This duration is indicated on the SW timeline. In the figure below, a pitch anomaly is 
predicted to occur in approximately 30 seconds. 
Figure 8. Predicted and Current Anomaly Indications. (Top) Predicted pitch anomaly indication in 30 seconds; (Bottom) Current 
anomaly indication at present. 
If a predicted anomaly manifests and crosses the data threshold associated with an anomaly at present, 
the SW/SSOT and EICAS alerts change from amber to red and the master warning aural sounds. 
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Changes from Honeywell Evaluation to NASA LaRC Evaluation 
The following images highlight the design changes from the 2018 Honeywell Evaluation to the 2019 
NASA evaluation. After anomalous data is removed, the PFD no longer uses an amber box to indicate 
what has happened, which source is impacted, and provide guidance. Instead, the PFD shows a simple 
red flag near the anomalous information. The explanatory information is now provided in the SW/SSOT 
on the MFD. Airspeed, Pitch, and Radar Altimeter (RA) anomalies are depicted below. 
Figure 9. Airspeed Anomaly. (Left) Airspeed anomaly indication for Honeywell evaluation; (Right) Airspeed anomaly indication 
for NASA LaRC evaluation. 
Figure 10. Pitch Anomaly. (Left) Pitch anomaly indication for Honeywell evaluation; (Right) Pitch anomaly indication for NASA 
LaRC evaluation. 
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Figure 11. RA Anomaly. (Left) RA anomaly indication for Honeywell evaluation; (Right) RA anomaly indication for NASA LaRC 
evaluation. 
Comparison images are not provided for the SW/SSOT on the EICAS/MFD. The changes were mostly 
formatting related: larger font in SW, change “TRND” icon to “PRED” icon, remove graphical depictions 
of data anomaly from SSOT. 
Methods 
At this stage of technology maturity, our objective is to elicit pilot feedback on the technology to both 
validate the operational value and improve the design prior to further development. Accordingly, we 
conducted a formative evaluation consisting of short scenarios to demonstrate the technologies in 
simulated flight scenarios within a motion-based simulator that replicates the flight deck of a large civil 
transport aircraft. During this evaluation, we were primarily concerned with pilots' subjective 
impressions of the technologies and objective metrics related to their use of the technologies during 
flight operations. 
Scenarios 
To ensure that the crews understood the technologies of interest, scenarios were blocked together into 
Training, Baseline and Experimental blocks. The crews first received two training flights to familiarize 
themselves with the simulator, followed by three baseline scenarios in which an anomaly occurred but 
no technology interventions were provided, and then six experimental scenarios with the experimental 
technology. Within each block, the scenario presentation order was randomized. After the completion 
of all scenarios, a demonstration scenario illustrated one proposed behavior of returning display 
elements after an anomaly clears. Accordingly, all participants experienced the scenarios in the 
following table.  Each scenario is mapped to a relevant aircraft incident/accident.
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Table 2. Evaluation Scenario Details 
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To provide opportunities for crew familiarization with the flight deck, the first training trial consisted of 
runway takeoff from KDCA destined for KJFK under VMC conditions with climb, cruise, and descent 
phases before the anomaly occurred in the descent phase. All other scenarios initiated on the CAMRN 
FOUR STAR destined for KJFK under CAT II conditions, either at FL190 at SIE (approximately 5 minutes 
from top of descent) or at FL110 at CAMRN. With thunderstorms near the airport, these scenarios were 
completed with light to moderate turbulence. Weather and traffic were added to increase complexity 
which in turn increases workload; this increases the likelihood that participants experience the 
technology within a task context that approximates realistic workload. 
Procedure 
The following experimental procedure was approved by an external institutional review board (IRB) 
(Arclight, Inc IRB000087) on August 6, 2019 with approval number HON-2019-004 as well as being 
separately approved by NASA LaRC IRB (FWA00020089). 
For all crews but one (Crew 4), two pilots participated together as a crew. The First Officer (FO) for Crew 
4 could not attend due to illness so a qualified research pilot participated as a confederate FO. Before 
starting the experiment, participants provided informed consent, were briefed on the aims of the study 
and the configuration of the flight deck and agreed upon role of Captain and First Officer (FO). Captains 
sat in the left seat and First Officers sat in the right seat. The role of pilot flying (PF) and PM was 
prescribed per the scenario details provided above. A flight plan was pre-loaded for all scenarios and 
pilots were asked to manage altitude and speeds per the Flight Management Computer (FMC) guidance. 
PM was asked to perform routine monitoring tasks, respond to simulated ATC communications, and 
respond to all PF commands in accordance with standard operating procedures (SOP). 
Pilots were instructed to verbalize their awareness and decision-making process in response to 
anomalous situations. Each scenario lasted approximately 10-15 minutes. Following the introduction of 
the anomaly, scenarios ended after the crew discussed the anomaly and decided upon a course of 
action. After all scenarios, experimenters would encourage pilots to comment on the technology design. 
The entire protocol lasted approximately 8-9 hours including lunch and breaks. 
At least one secondary task was used during each scenario to keep the pilots focused on flying the 
aircraft rather than fixating on anomaly detection. Secondary tasks consisted of configuring the aircraft 
for landing, ANTI-SKID EICAS message, TCAS traffic alert, or ATC datalink messages to slow to a certain 
speed when passing through a specified altitude or being instructed to monitor a certain frequency. 
Also, as mentioned previously, weather conditions were poor (Cat II) with cells shown on the weather 
radar display and moderate turbulence. These conditions distracted participants such that they would 
not be able to fixate on sensor anomalies in a manner not representative of flight operations. 
Design 
A within-subjects design was employed such that all participants saw the same scenarios. After each 
trial, experimenters administered the Bedford and NASA TLX workload scales on a tablet computer. 
Following the end of the Baseline and Experimental blocks, experimenters administered the following on 
a tablet computer: Bedford and NASA TLX workload scales, Situation Awareness Rating Technique 
(SART), Acceptability Index, Complexity Index, System Usability Scale, and general comments. After 
completing all scenarios, experimenters followed-up with a post-evaluation questionnaire. 
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Experimenters captured pilot comments during and after the trials in written notes and later transcribed 
and categorized them for analysis. 
Participants 
Air Transport pilots were recruited to participate in the PITL evaluation. In total, 6 crews participated 
and completed all scenarios. The 11 pilots (10 men and 1 woman, all Part 121) represented 3 major U.S. 
passenger airlines and 1 cargo airline. Five of the six crews consisted of a 2-person crew, but one of the 
six crews utilized an experimenter as confederate FO due to illness. Pilot demographics are described in 
the table below: 
Age Total Flight Hours 
Common Aircraft Type 
Flown 
Mean = 56.1 years Mean = 13,324 hours 
• B737
• B747
• B757
• B767
• B777
• A319
• A320
• MD-80
Range = 47-65 years Range = 4,729-27,000 hours 
Table 3.  Pilot Demographics. 
Flight Simulator Description 
The pilot evaluation for this phase was conducted in the NASA Langley Cockpit Motion Facility’s 
Research Flight Deck (NASA). The motion-based simulator is a hybrid design, mimicking aspects of a 
Boeing 757/767 – using the aerodynamic model and overhead panel, a Boeing 787 – incorporating four 
17” LCDs and dual EFBs/HUDs, and an Airbus – in that it uses sidesticks. During this evaluation, 
experimenters manipulated the information sources and provided the new technology indicators and 
alerts both auditorily and visually (on the PFD and MFD/EICAS) as described previously. The HUDs were 
stowed and not used. 
Figure 12. NASA LaRC Research Flight Deck. 
As a reminder, erroneous display elements were removed the PFD on the affected side, and the 
SW/SSOT was presented at the bottom of the EICAS on the affected side. 
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Results 
Subjective Workload 
Both the Bedford Workload Scale (Roscoe, 1984) and the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) (Hart & Staveland, 
1988) were administered. Scenarios were designed to ensure that pilots had the time and cognitive 
resources to consider and evaluate the technologies. Reported workload indicated that subjective 
workload was relatively low across all conditions, as indicated by the figures below. The experimental 
technology intervention did not contribute to an increase in subjectively rated workload as indicated by 
both Bedford (mean Baseline = 3.36, meanExp = 3.15) and NASA-TLX responses. All graphed means include 
standard error bars. 
Figure 13. Bedford Workload responses averaged across participants. 
With only six crews, statistical tests were not utilized to compare NASA-TLX responses, however, there 
appears to be a trend for lower workload responses when completing the trials with the experimental 
technology. This is more pronounced for the pilot monitoring (see right pane of Fig. 14). 
Figure 14. NASA TLX responses for Pilot Flying (Left pane) and Pilot Monitoring (Right pane) for the 6 subscales. 
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Acceptability 
The following custom scale was used to assess perceived acceptability, as used by NASA teams on AIME 
experiments (Evans et al., 2016). 
Rate the acceptability of the experimental technology (from 1 to 7): 
1 = Very unacceptable. I did not like the technology and would not use it in normal 
operations. 
4 = Average. I liked the technology and would use it in normal operations, but would like to 
see some improvements. 
7 = Very acceptable. I like the technology very much, and would use it without any 
improvements. 
The experimental technology intervention received high ratings of acceptability (mean = 5.82). This 
aligns with the narrative feedback (discussed below), indicating generally positive feedback for the 
anomaly detection concept, with specific topics for improvement. 
Complexity 
The following custom scale was used to assess perceived complexity, as used by NASA teams on AIME 
experiments (Evans et al., 2016). 
Complexity, 1-10, 1 = Not complex, 10 = Extremely complex 
• Rate the complexity of the operational environment
• Rate the complexity of the system/automation
• Rate the complexity of the information
• Rate the complexity of the task
Complexity ratings were separated between Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring. As seen in Fig. 15, the 
Pilot Flying reported slightly higher complexity ratings for the scenarios completed with the 
experimental technology, while the Pilot Monitoring reported slightly lower complexity ratings for 
scenarios completed with the experimental technology. 
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Figure 15. Complexity responses for Pilot Flying (Left pane) and Pilot Monitoring (Right pane). 
The lower complexity ratings for the Pilot Monitoring may loosely explain the NASA-TLX ratings above, 
where the Pilot Monitoring reported slightly lower workload ratings across the subscales. This comports 
with the design philosophy of the SW/SSOT which is to support the monitoring function.  An 
interpretation of this trend could be that the technology enabled monitoring such that the PM 
experienced the task and task environment as less complex. 
Usability 
After the block of baseline trials and experimental trials, the System Usability Scale (SUS) was 
administered (Brooke, 2013). 
Technology Usability, SUS method, Rate 10 statements 
With respect to the experimental technology, radio buttons 1 - 5 (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = 
Strongly Agree): 
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex.
3. I thought the system was easy to use.
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system.
5. I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
8. I found the system cumbersome to use.
9. I felt very confident using the system.
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.
SUS items alternate between items where high scores are desirable ("Would Use Frequently") and items 
where low scores are desirable ("Unnecessarily Complex"). As is illustrated in Fig. 16 below, the 
experimental intervention received favorable usability ratings. Participant ratings suggest they would be 
confident using the technology, and would use it frequently; moreover, the technologies were not 
perceived as complex, cumbersome, nor requiring a particularly steep learning curve. SUS scores 
indicate that integration with the flight deck could be improved, which will be addressed in the 
Discussion section. 
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Figure 16. System Usability Scale responses. (Left pane) SUS Factors averaged across participants; and (Right pane) Overall SUS 
scores for Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring. 
Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) 
After the block of baseline experimental trials, the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) was 
administered (Taylor, 1990). For the most part, there is not an appreciable difference between SART 
ratings provided on baseline trials and experimental trial with the technology. 
Although there are no statistical conclusions to draw, it is worth noting that for Pilot Flying and Pilot 
Monitoring, there is a small trend for lower ratings of Attention Supply during Experimental Trials, which 
may contribute to the slightly higher rating of Understand Information and Situation during 
Experimental Trials. 
Figure 17. Situation Awareness Rating Technique responses for Pilot Flying (Left pane) and Pilot Monitoring (Right pane). 
Behavioral Responses 
Time-stamped video recordings were used to quantify: 1) the time required for the crew to detect that 
an anomalous situation had occurred, and 2) the time required to decide on a course of action (COA) 
after detecting the anomaly. 
Pilot recognition of anomalous data before any aural indication 
Both baseline and experimental trials included anomalies that triggered multiple aural alerts. For 
example, both triggered legacy aural alerts for "ATT Disagree” and “IAS Disagree.” Given the 
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commonality of aural indications, we looked at all trials to assess how frequently crews recognized an 
anomalous situation prior to the aural alert. Of the 54 trials (6 crews × 9 trials), crews recognized 
anomalies prior to any aural alerts on three trials, or 5.5% of the trials. This suggests that detecting 
anomalies in modern aircraft is based only on visual indications is difficult, corroborating results of 
accident and incident analyses. There are likely many reasons for this, chief among them is that pilots 
are trained to trust displayed information and high demands on visual attention; pilots can miss or 
overlook important cues, even if attentive and vigilant. 
Predicted and Current anomaly timing 
Before considering timing results, it should be noted that Predicted anomalies effectively start earlier 
than Current anomalies, as subtle perturbations in the affected data source escalate to a higher 
magnitude and transition to a Current Anomaly. Fig. 18 illustrates how the timing works for a Predicted 
and Current anomaly. 
Figure 18. Explanation of anomaly timing for predicted and current anomalies. 
Given the difficulty in determining crew awareness of predicted anomalies, we chose to calculate the 
“start” time for crew awareness for Predicted trials from the onset of the current anomaly, not the 
onset of the initial perturbations. This aligned Predicted trials with the timing of Current Anomalies in 
both Baseline and Experimental trials, enabling comparisons.  Crew debriefing comments indicated that 
the predicted alerts started orienting them to the situation and priming them for a decision. 
Time to recognize anomalous elements 
Experimenters reviewed the audio-video logs for all trials to identify when, if ever, crews recognized 
that some displayed element was anomalous. Elapsed time to recognize any anomalous elements was 
calculated from the onset of the anomaly until the crew verbalized recognition of a specific anomaly. 
There were a few trails where experimenters could not definitively identify a moment of recognition. 
Radar altimeter (RA) trials were unique in that anomalies occurred late in the approach (1400-2100 ft 
AGL), so crews were under time pressure and, in all but one of the RA trials, nearly immediately initiated 
a Go-Around. Crews reported that they responded to the aural alerts and presence of any Caution or 
Warning EICAS, by deciding to Go-Around, without recognizing the issue was with the PF's RA indication. 
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As noted above, Baseline and Experimental Current trials were similar in the rapid onset of the anomaly, 
enabling a direct comparison. Predicted anomalies, however, were slowly developing situations that 
started with very subtle perturbations. Consequently, “start” time for Baseline, Experimental Current, 
and Experimental Predicted trials was defined from the onset of the Current anomaly for timing 
calculation.  
Experimenters were unable to discern a definitive moment of recognition for 1 Baseline and 1 
Experimental Current Airspeed Trial, thus there are only 5 samples for each instead of 6. As depicted in 
Fig. 19, although there are limited samples, there is certainly a trend with non-overlapping standard 
error bars for crews to be faster to recognize the anomalies in Experimental trials (both Current and 
Predicted) than Baseline trials. This suggests that the EICAS notification and PFD display mitigation, 10-
seconds of flashing before the anomalous elements was removed and an anomaly flag was presented, 
was effective in orienting crew attention to the anomalous indication. 
Figure 19. Average time required to recognize anomalous display elements across Baseline and Experimental Trials (Current and 
Predicted). 
Decision time after anomaly onset 
For all trials, experimenters reviewed the audio-video logs to identify when crews decided on a final 
course of action in response to an anomalous situation. A common decision was to discontinue 
approach into JFK which has Cat II conditions and go to an airport with better weather. One of the 
impacts of the anomalies was that the flight was no longer LAND-3 capable, meaning it was not legal to 
continue the published Cat-2 approach procedure. Elapsed decision time was calculated from the onset 
of Current anomalies, defined a priori in experimental scripts as time or altitude triggers, to the 
identified decision point. Experimenters could confidently identify the decision point for all trials, so 
results depicted in Fig. 20 are for all 6 crews. 
There is a trend, with non-overlapping standard error bars, indicating that decisions were made faster 
during Experimental trials (Current and Predicted) than Baseline trials. This suggests that the 
Experimental Display interventions can streamline the process toward deciding on a course of action. 
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Figure 20. Average time for crew to decide on a course of action for each type of anomaly and condition. 
Pilots commented that removing the anomalous indication simplified their determination of which side 
of the aircraft had correct information. Several pilots also commented that they would be distracted by 
a displayed anomalous indication, continuously referencing it to assess whether it was valid again. While 
the results are preliminary, the magnitude of the time difference for the Airspeed anomaly suggests 
crews could decide over 2 minutes faster with anomaly alerting, possibly supporting more operational 
flexibility and less disruption. 
As mentioned previously, crews responded very quickly to the aural and visual indication associated 
with the RA anomalies. With such fast responses, a floor effect likely precludes discerning and 
interpreting any meaningful differences. 
Course of action analysis 
For all trials, experimenters reviewed the audio-video logs to identify actions the crews performed in 
response to an anomaly. After reviewing all the logs, experimenters identified the following categories 
of actions: 
• Executed a Go-Around (Go-Around)
• Ask for ATC Accommodation (Declare Emergency, Ask for Vectors and/or Block Altitude)
• Divert for Better Weather
• Continue Approach
• Transfer Control to PM
• Transfer Control back to PF
• Check Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for Continuing Approach
• Experimenter Prompt (Experimenter prompted the crew: remind Cat II weather at destination,
offer help with bringing up standby display and/or switching to ALTN)
After categorization, experimenters then revisited the annotated log notes and identified which actions 
were performed during each trial. Figure 21 depicts the frequency of these categories of actions broken 
out by Anomaly Type (Current Pitch, Current RA, etc.) and Trial Type (Baseline, Experimental). 
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Figure 21. Actions Taken by Anomaly/Trial Type. Experimenter prompts are excluded from the figure. 
The figure reinforces the other observations about RA trials - that crews mostly (16 of 18 trials) 
performed an immediate Go-Around, regardless of Trial Type. Execution of a Go-Around precluded the 
performance of any other categorized action, save one crew who Transferred Control to PM and 
Continued the Approach during the Predicted RA Trial. 
When examining Current Airspeed and Pitch trials across Trial Type (Baseline, Experimental) as depicted 
in Table 4, a pattern emerges of action profiles excluding Experimenter Prompts: crews performed more 
actions across more action categories during Baseline trials. Although from a small sample, it is 
encouraging that the Experimental Mitigation seems to support more consistent and fewer action steps. 
One interpretation is that the additional information about the anomalies focuses decision making 
which results in resolving the situation with fewer and more consistent actions. 
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Current Pitch Current Airspeed Current RA 
Baseline 
Actions 12 14 6 
Types 6 4 1 
Experimental 
Actions 6 7 5 
Types 2 3 1 
Table 4. Actions Performed by Trial/Anomaly Type. Experimenter prompts are excluded from the table. 
Demonstration Scenario 
One demonstration scenario was administered after the experimental trials, without the use of 
turbulence, to solicit feedback about returning anomalous data display elements after the underlying 
data source anomaly cleared. This is a documented phenomenon, as several accidents and incidents 
involved an intermittent blockage that cleared (e.g., Air France 447 blockage cleared as they lost 
altitude). In terms of the IDAD detection algorithm, it is possible to detect the return of anomalous data 
to the expected range. 
In the demonstration scenario, a partial pitot blockage initially caused an airspeed anomaly. After four 
minutes, the partial pitot blockage clears. The IDAD algorithm detected the return of valid airspeed and 
triggered the return of airspeed display elements to the affected PFD. As with the removal of PFD 
elements, the airspeed blinks while returning to the PFD. 
Across the six crews, pilots generally supported returning the display elements, provided a high level of 
confidence in its accuracy, but had differing opinions on what determines whether the data returns 
(e.g., return when data is valid, return when data is valid only after a dampening period, have an 
anomaly on new data source for original data source to return). However, crews did not want the data 
source to be removed and returned repeatedly, as this would become a nuisance and with each onset 
would likely drive the crew to repeat the associated checklist again. In terms of how the data should 
return when the anomaly clears, three of the crews indicated a preference for a notification that the 
anomaly cleared to allow pilots to initiate the return of display elements and switching data sources. 
Discussion 
The objective of this evaluation was to elicit pilot feedback on the combined IDAD + SW/SSOT 
technology to both validate the operational value, understand its performance impact, and improve the 
design prior to further development. Along with NASA LaRC colleagues, we conducted a formative 
evaluation consisting of short scenarios to demonstrate the technologies in simulated air transport flight 
scenarios within a motion-based simulator. 
Overall Findings 
Across the subjective ratings, pilots rated the combined IDAD + SW/SSOT technology intervention 
favorably and there was clearly consensus on the operational value of the proposed technology. 
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In terms of workload, Bedford and NASA-TLX ratings were no higher for the experimental technology. 
Interestingly, there is a trend for the PM to experience lower workload for Mental Demand, Temporal 
Demand, and Effort during experimental trials. In terms of complexity, PF reported slightly higher 
complexity ratings for the scenarios completed with the experimental technology, while PM reported 
slightly lower complexity ratings for the experimental technology. In terms of usability, the experimental 
technology received favorable usability ratings. Participants indicated they would be confident using the 
technology. Moreover, the technology was not perceived as complex, cumbersome, nor requiring a 
particularly steep learning curve. Usability scores do indicate that integration with the flight deck could 
be improved. 
In terms of behavioral observations, crews were both faster to recognize anomalous events in 
Experimental trials than Baseline trials and faster to decide on a course of action in Experimental trials 
than Baseline trials. This was true both for Current and Predicted Experimental trials. While there was 
no difference between Current and Predicted trials, Crew debriefing comments indicated that the 
predicted alerts started orienting them to the situation and priming them for a decision. 
Pilots also provided many suggestions to improve the design and expand the functionality to further 
improve the technologies. Most importantly, they were supportive of integrating anomaly alerts with 
the existing crew alerting philosophy and removing erroneous display elements from the PFD. 
The following observations are noted based on the subjective data, objective data, video recordings, and 
experimenter notes. The training and certification implications are also discussed for each section. 
Predicted Anomalies 
The concept of predicting the onset of an alert was well supported by the crews. During the post-
evaluation survey period, crews noted specifically that it addresses startle/surprise by providing an early 
indication that an upcoming situation could impact autoflight. As expected, the crews noted that 
judgments regarding data validity must have a high level of confidence. 
A predicted onset time interval was provided to crews by way of the predicted anomaly icon on the SW. 
None of the crews utilized the precise indication of time to onset, instead noting that they were aware 
that they had some amount of time to discuss and prepare prior to anomaly onset. 
Consequently, we believe the implementation could be changed so that no SW/SSOT is required, and 
predicted anomalies are indicated in the EICAS when they are below some threshold (e.g., 90 secs from 
present) and on the PFD with a predicted anomaly flag adjacent to impacted display element. A 
predicted EICAS energy alert was implemented and evaluated on previous NASA evaluations (Duan et 
al., 2016). This would provide consistency and predictability in the case of receiving a predicted anomaly 
and removes the burden from the prediction algorithm to be completely precise in terms of the 
detection interval; furthermore, by picking a relatively short interval threshold, such as 90 seconds, the 
time estimate is more likely to be accurate than a longer interval. 
Additionally, a minimum prediction window could also be established, in terms of proximity to onset at 
current. If a predicted anomaly is detected at 3 seconds, there is questionable value in providing a 
predicted anomaly followed by a current anomaly in rapid succession. Such a situation could confuse the 
crew, therefore we believe a minimum threshold should be established as well (e.g., 5 seconds). 
26 
It should be noted for future investigations that there is a time/accuracy tradeoff for anomaly detection 
in that the longer a relationship is evaluated, the higher the confidence in the rating. However, this 
comes at the cost of timeliness. If the evaluation period lasts too long, the utility of providing an alert to 
the crew could be lost. 
Certification implications – high; predictive alerts represent a new type of alert and additional work is 
needed to specify precisely how pilots should handle them in the context of other operations. The logic 
and real-time operation of the algorithms being used to detect these new anomalies would need to be 
detailed, but it does not necessarily require any advanced analytics like machine learning; moreover, it is 
more transparent than a black box approach in that it explainable in terms of common statistical 
methods and known time and magnitude thresholds. 
Training implications – high; predictive alerting would need to be trained and integrated into the pilot 
workflow. While the notion of predictive alerting seemed intuitive when briefing pilots, they would need 
to be trained on how to react to and handle predictive alerts.  
Procedural implications – high;  care should be taken to define how crews respond to predicted alerts.  
Currently, most alerts reflect current situations so there is less ambiguity in how to respond than an 
alert for something that could happen in the near future.  Procedures should support a consistent 
response to predicted alerts that is aligned with their intended function and operational utility.  For 
example, they could be treated as an “awareness” item where pilots should communicate and brief how 
they would response, but not take any actions until it escalates to a current anomaly alert.  
EICAS/ECAM/Crew Alerting Integration 
The familiarity of the crew alerting system of each target platform should be leveraged. This dictates 
that each anomaly will have its own checklist or be integrated into existing checklists. Such an approach 
utilizes a familiar format and workflow when the crew is handling abnormal situations, leverages pilot 
training and expectations, and reduces certification risk while not compromising utility of the new 
anomaly detection and alerting. 
Certification implications – low to medium; a significant effort would have to be undertaken to 
harmonize the new anomaly alerts with existing checklist procedures and verify their effectiveness; 
however, one mitigating factor is that the checklist actions would be similar to legacy checklists (e.g. IAS 
Disagree). 
Training implications – low; any new anomaly alert would have to be evaluated whether an associated 
checklist procedure was required.  Regardless of whether it required a checklist or not, crews would 
need additional training on how to respond to anomaly alerts. 
PFD Element Removal 
All crews were receptive to the notion of removing erroneous information from the PFD. While we did 
not set out to determine if this drove behaviors, sped up detection time, or improved decision making, 
we suspect that it did not compromise decision making as crews would reference the absence of 
information during problem solving. Furthermore, the crews indicated in the post-evaluation survey that 
removing erroneous PFD elements simplified decision making and discouraged their use of erroneous 
data. 
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Certification implications – medium; by aligning PFD element removal with that described in the Boeing 
787 FCOM, we hope to minimize the certification impact of such a proposition. However, we have also 
proposed additional flags, that would be needed to be integrated as well. Additionally, we proposed a 
period of blinking prior to removal. 
Training implications – medium; again, by aligning with other PFD element removal being replaced by 
flags, we hope to minimize the training requirements, but pilots would need to be made aware of and 
train with this change. 
Status Widget 
While there was some positive feedback regarding the SW/SSOT, the majority of the crew alerting can 
be achieved by integrating the SW/SSOT information in the impacted PFD and the existing crew alerting 
systems for each platform. This conclusion is framed by the current reality of the PM role. If the PM role 
were to be reconsidered in a future cockpit, with redesigned displays, the SW/SSOT should be 
considered as a novel display element likely incurring increased certification risk. However, if the 
SW/SSOT were to be considered as a retrofit option, we believe it should be placed on the PM side 
instead of the PF. 
In terms of specific findings in the present evaluation, the font size was possible too small and red text 
needed additional contrast. This, combined with the SW/SSOT being located outside of their normal 
scan, made it more difficult to quickly reference. Additionally, the predicted time estimate was not 
utilized, as crews only noted that they had some amount of time before the predicted anomaly 
occurred. The expected items (e.g., Descent checklist Due in 4 mins) received variable feedback. For the 
RA scenarios, anything beyond the aural alert, including SW/SSOT information is questionable as the 
crews did not have time to view it and opted to initiate a go around. Alert suppression under certain 
conditions (e.g., below certain altitudes) should be investigated. 
Certification implications – high; the SW/SSOT represents a new display concept leveraging time and as 
of the evaluation was placed on a flight critical display. Accordingly, we expect the certification of this 
for retrofit, or for a future PM display concept, would require significant work to be certified. 
Training implications – high; the SW/SSOT represents a new display concept leveraging time. Training 
pilots to monitor this display element would require extensive training. 
Retrofit Recommendations 
After considering the evaluation results and certification risk, we provide the following 
recommendations in terms of retrofit implementations. 
Anomaly Detection 
In addition to the existing data validation logic, failure annunciations, and legacy EICAS alerts, we believe 
that an independent monitoring system, akin to the IDAD monitoring technology, should be introduced 
to increase and expand validation of avionics sensor data. 
As demonstrated in the present evaluation, predicted and current anomalies can be detected with 
redundant sources (ADRS1 vs. ADRS2). Additionally, predicted and current anomalies could be detected 
with independent sources (ADRS1 vs IRS1), although we have not yet developed this more advanced 
technology. 
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Crew Alerting 
To align predicted and current anomalies with the existing alerting philosophies, we believe predicted 
anomalies should be Memo messages (white) and current anomalies should be Caution messages 
(amber). This also aligns with conclusion of previous predicted alert evaluation (Duan et al., 2016). In the 
present evaluation, predicted anomalies were amber Cautions and current anomalies were red 
Warnings. Consequently, crews sometimes took immediate action in the form of automation changes 
upon seeing the predicted anomaly (e.g., crew 2, scenario 50, run 6). While this is encouraging in terms 
of crew ASA, we do not necessarily want the crew to take immediate action upon receiving a predicted 
anomaly. Rather, the aim is for the crew to discuss the situation and prepare for their next action, which 
could be better facilitated with a Memo message. An example of this is crew 1 (scenario 51, run 12) 
where the FO puts his hand on the throttles upon seeing the predicted alert. 
Additionally, new checklists should be created for novel anomalies (e.g., sensor exhibiting too little 
variance), even if it is awareness items with no associated actions like the “IAS DISAGREE” alert and 
checklist, which was also triggered as a legacy alert for high variance airspeed anomalies. We realize that 
this creates a certification risk, but it is needed for new anomalies, so whenever possible the anomaly 
messages should be incorporated into the indenting or categorization scheme of related legacy alerts, 
like “IAS DISAGREE” in the crew alerting system. From this evaluation, an example of a novel anomaly 
would the Radar Altimeter since there was no related disagree alert like there is for Airspeed and Pitch. 
For aircraft that do not have an EICAS, it has display space for information on the Engine Display, below 
Engine Alerts, with master caution/master warning. For example, on the A320/330/350, the 
ECAM/Warning Display could be used for integration along with the checklists. 
PFD Indications 
In terms of PFD indications, based on the evaluation feedback and precedent in instrument training, we 
believe anomalous PFD elements should be removed from the display and replaced with an anomaly 
flag along with a corresponding EICAS message, as tested in the evaluation. 
There was unanimous support for this in the evaluation, but this may come with high certification risk. 
We do, however, think there is precedent from the current way PFD Failure Flags are depicted on 
modern aircraft, and from general aviation instrument training where pilots cover erroneous display 
elements with a sticky note or instrument display cover during training. Information removal is a familiar 
concept for all pilots with an instrument rating. 
If removal of PFD information, as tested in the evaluation, was deemed too risky to implement, we 
would recommend using the PFD flags, but leaving the anomalous information on the PFD. One crew 
indicated that pilots may want to compare the anomalous data against other sources. Ultimately, we 
believe removal of this information supports safer operation, in the event that pilots do not notice the 
failure flag and trust the anomalous information. 
Another alternative to removal of PFD elements is to provide some indication on the impacted element, 
in addition to the PFD flag and EICAS message. This could be in the form of a yellow line or cross (i.e., 
“X”) through the affected element. However, we believe these values could potentially be employed by 
the pilots or misread due to the occluding element. 
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Status Widget 
Given that data anomalies are ultimately quite rare, we believe the SW/SSOT concept is potentially too 
risky to retrofit, and instead believe it should be considered as a forward fit option with a fully 
reconsidered PM role and displays.  The infrequent utilization may not support the certification and 
training cost for retrofit. 
The current location of the SW/SSOT, at the bottom of the EICAS, is an underutilized space, but it is not 
currently a part of the pilot scan pattern. The location of the SW/SSOT could be reconsidered in a 
forward fit. 
Themes and Precursors 
In the Contract’s Year 2 Report (Whitlow and Dillard, 2018), we assessed how well the mitigation 
technologies addressed the themes and precursors common in incidents/accidents involving 
compromised pilot state awareness identified in Year 1 (Whitlow et al., 2017). We do not repeat those 
conclusions here but do reference them as the mappings are the same for the present NASA LaRC 
evaluation.  Please see Appendix A for the Year 2 Themes and Precursors conclusions. 
Next Steps 
The present evaluation findings are helpful in guiding future iterations of the anomaly detection 
methodology and the pilot interface. In future iterations, the most impactful changes will likely be: i) 
expanding the anomaly detection to multiple, independent sensors as well as ii) creating platform-
specific interfaces that employ PFD elements removal with flags plus fully integrated alerts with tailored 
checklists. 
Detection Methodology 
The IDAD detection technology used in the present evaluation monitored a single sensor to detect each 
type of anomaly (e.g., high amounts of variability in IRS1 pitch). The next step is to mature the 
technology to compare redundant sensors (IRS1 pitch vs. IRS2 pitch), then to compare independent 
sources (IRS1 pitch vs ADRS1 airspeed). Our partner, AT CORP, developed several proofs of concept 
angle of attack (AOA) estimators based on independent sources, then evaluated their efficacy for 
capturing ground truth AOA variance.  They documented their methodology and some promising early 
results in a report that is in Appendix B.  Additionally, there is no limit to the dimensionality of multi-
source detection. For example, airspeed, pitch, and AOA could be included in a three-dimensional 
relationship, and so on. This will increase the confidence in the assessment, could support additional 
types of anomaly detection, and may provide additional computational tractability. 
Further testing of the detection methodology would best take place on an aircraft bench, such as the 
Honeywell Embraer E2 Bench, where the sensor inputs directly reflect the aircraft configuration and 
data can be simulated to produce anomalous situations. 
Pilot Interface Design 
Based on the present evaluation results, the pilot facing interface could see some significant changes 
that would benefit from being evaluated, some that are platform-specific considerations (Airbus, 
Boeing, Embraer). For such an evaluation, the recommended scope is removal of information from the 
PFD plus flags, combined with fully integrated EICAS/ECAM alerting with tailored checklists (no status 
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widget). For the anomalies being tested, we propose drafting a checklist for use in a future flight 
simulator evaluation. 
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Appendix A:  Themes and Precursors Conclusions from Year 2 Report 
To review the impact of the technologies, we assessed how well the technologies addressed the themes 
and precursors common in incidents/accidents involving compromised pilot state awareness identified 
in Year 1 (Whitlow et al., 2017). After reviewing the results, we concluded that these technologies 
addressed the following themes and precursors (bold text), with rationale provided. 
• Flight path Management (FPM)
o Unstabilized approaches
o Problem with ground-based navigation support--- monitor altitude
o Slowly developing situation
▪ Rationale: Predicted anomaly detection would identify a slow degradation of
airspeed or slow bank that could likely be missed by crew.
o Distracted by non-flight critical situations
• Aircraft Systems
o Bad Data
▪ Rationale: Anomaly detection, in general, provides another safeguard against
data irregularities that are not associated with an annunciated failure by the
sensing system.
o Lack of specific alerts
▪ Rationale: Predicted and current alerts are an addition that would enhance
pilot state awareness beyond the current state of practice.
o Uncommanded control maneuvers
o Complex mode logic
o Procedural Support
• Flight Crew Interface (FCI)
o Incorrect response to alert
▪ Rationale: Current and predictive alert could identify impacts to better inform
how the crew responds to the situation.
o Cognitive tunneling
o Startle/surprise to unexpected situation
▪ Rationale: By providing alerts to current and predicted anomalies with
explanations, crew will be less likely to succumb to startle/surprise; as a
result, they should develop a more accurate understanding of the actual
ii 
airplane state and be more likely to make the correct decision on how to 
respond. 
o Lack of shared awareness of crew
▪ Rationale: Both technologies encourage crew to discuss the situation and
compare different information sources, likely developing an improved and
more accurate shared awareness of airplane state.
o Monitoring challenges
▪ Rationale: Anomaly detector provides an automated means to monitor for
possible situations related to critical flight data then alert the crew; the
timeline would provide a new means to help structure the crew’s monitoring
behavior, including expected and unexpected events.
o Automation awareness
▪ Rationale: Predicted anomaly notification includes likely system impact so that
should the autopilot (AP) or autothrottle (AT) disconnect, crew should
recognize these disconnects better and understand the reason behind them.
o Poor CRM
▪ Rationale: By providing new information relevant to airplane state, crew are
encouraged to discuss; furthermore, the proposed central location of
SW/SSOT (EICAS) physically and cognitively brings crew together to discuss
situations, potentially improving CRM.
o Pilot fatigue
iii 
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1 Introduction 
Under a 2015 NASA Research Announcement in support of the Airspace Technology 
Demonstration (ATD) Project, Honeywell is performing a multi-year study to investigate 
technologies for indicating airplane system status and dependencies during complex, non-
normal situations. In particular, Honeywell is researching and developing technologies to 
attempt to mitigate the Loss of Airplane System State Awareness (LASSA) including: 
enhanced displays, novel information management approaches, and new alerting 
functions. In a 2017 interim report, Honeywell identified 26 candidate solutions related to 
display, alerting, and information management that could help mitigate and support pilots 
in recovering from loss of airplane state awareness. One of the 26 candidate solutions 
proposed the development and application of data source validation algorithms and 
alerting to notify the crew of non-failure sensor anomalies.1 In their report Honeywell 
describes the problem and proposed solutions as follows: 
Source Data Validation & Indication 
When an input source fails, such as air data, radar altimeter, or an 
angle of attack sensor, systems handle the situation rather elegantly by 
de-coupling from autoflight, automatically switching the data source, 
and providing an alert to the crew. However, most aircraft systems do 
not handle non-failure anomalous data elegantly— they present the 
erroneous data to the crew (e.g., West Air Sweden Cargo CRJ200), and 
allow autoflight to be driven by it (e.g., Turkish 1951 B737-800). An 
intermittent anomaly can be particularly insidious, since the crew can 
have difficulty determining what display source to trust. Most input 
data are validated with voting methods of like-sensors, which has 
contributed to accidents. In two separate examples (Lufthansa LH1829 
A321 (05-Nov-14); XL Airways End of lease Functional Check Flight 
(FCF) A320 (27-Nov-200), where the system invalidated a correct AOA 
sensor because it differed from the other two AOA sensors that had 
been fouled by precipitation and washing without protection, 
respectively, and froze at a fixed value once at altitude. 
The Team proposes to augment existing voting methods with robust 
statistical methods with respect to how flight critical input data sources 
are validated. It would be rather straightforward to develop a 
statistical model of sensor input that, once developed, could be used to 
evaluate whether current values deviate. If a deviation is detected, then 
the system would alert the crew to help improve their diagnosis of 
ongoing anomalous autoflight behavior, or help them to decide whether 
to disengage autoflight proactively. A sensed dimension would be still 
be presented, but it would transition to grayscale as a representation of 
diminishing trust in its accuracy. 
1 Report on Conceptual Designs and Recommendations for Further Development (Deliverable Item 6.4), December 5, 2017, Dr. 
Stephen Whitlow, Dr. Barbara Holder, Dr. Aaron Gannon, and Dr. Jeffrey Lancaster, Honeywell Aerospace Advanced 
Technology, Honeywell, Inc. 
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Based on discussions with Honeywell, ATCorp proposed and performed a study of 
methods by which the angle of attack of an aircraft can be validated without relying on 
measurements from an airplane’s air data system (ADS) or air data computer (ADC). The 
purpose of this document is to describe and evaluate proposed methods by which the 
angle of attack of an aircraft can be validated without relying on air-data measurements. 
These methods are based on well-established mathematical formulations describing the 
flight dynamics of a conventional fixed-wing aircraft. 
This document explores three methods: one based on flight path angle, one based on 
vertical acceleration, and one based on elevator deflection. The three methods were 
evaluated using a basic 6 DOF (Degree of Freedom) desktop research simulator. Due to 
the limited scope of the project, only simple methods were explored; but these methods 
provide useful insight into the nature of the problem. Based on the observations obtained 
in this study, further research into signal comparator systems should consider more 
sophisticated methods such as those involving Kalman filtering and state observers. 
1.1 Background 
Pilot Airplane System State Awareness is an interactive process between pilots, their 
aircraft and the environment in which the aircraft is operating. Often, one of the reasons 
for loss of state awareness is erroneous or conflicting information being given to the 
pilots. This can occur when sensors fail and aircraft systems fail to properly identify the 
problem. One particularly pernicious problem is the failure of the air data system. Since 
the ADS relies on direct interaction with the ambient environment to establish its 
parameters, it is exposed to atmospheric hazards such as moisture, extreme temperatures, 
and vibration, depending on the sensor/probe location. 
In particular, the measurement of Angle-Of-Attack (AOA), symbolized by the Greek 
letter  α(Alpha), is particularly vulnerable to failures.  As such, high assurance systems
have triple redundancy AOA sensors which are then compared by signal voting 
algorithms to determine the correct state. Most of the time, this level of redundancy is 
sufficient to ensure that the appropriate AOA is received by the ADS. However there
have been several instances, where multiple AOA sensors have been damaged 
simultaneously in a fashion such that a simple voting algorithm is unable to determine the 
appropriate signal. In these cases, the best result is for the system to determine the 
unreliability of the signal and either warn the air crew or engage reversionary modes to 
compensate. In rare instances, the failures have been pernicious enough that the voting 
algorithm chose the wrong AOA signal when two sensors failed at a similar measurement 
state. The result was that the voting algorithm failed to recognize the failure and provided 
erroneous information to the rest of the flight deck. 
2 Estimating Angle Of Attack 
There are multiple methods that can be used to indirectly determine the angle of attack of 
an aircraft from other state data. This document explores three methods, one based on the 
flight path angle, a second based on the vertical acceleration, zn , and a third based on the 
elevator deflection. 
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2.1 Estimating AOA Using Flight Path Angle 
The flight path angle of an aircraft is the angle its vertical path makes with the inertial 
horizontal plane. In steady level flight, the relationship between the pitch angle , the 
flight path angle a , and the angle of attack  , is shown in Figure 2.1 and Equation (2.1)
The pitch angle defines the angle the aircraft body axis makes with the horizontal plane, 
and the flight path angle is generally slightly lower.  The difference is the angle of attack. 



Figure 2.1. High level flow for flight planner 
a     (2.1) 
The flight path angle term carries the ‘a’ subscript denoting that the flight path angle is 
measured with respect to the air-mass. 
2.1.1 Cruise Flight and Other Considerations 
One important observation to make initially is that in cruise flight, where the flight path is 
level, the flight path angle will be zero.  Hence, the angle of attack will equal the pitch 
angle. Since this condition characterizes a large majority of the flight, the angle of attack 
can be easily monitored since it should equal the pitch angle exactly.  It can also be seen 
that for cruise flight no extensive calculation for a is required.  It is sufficient to 
determine that the vertical speed of the aircraft is close to zero within some tolerance. 
Beyond level cruise flight, it should be emphasized that this method is best employed 
only during steady operations. The calculation of AOA using this method is inherently 
problematic if the aircraft Phugoid dynamics are sufficiently excited. As will be explored 
further in Section 3, the Phugoid mode dominates the Pitch signal and the Flight Path 
Angle (FPA) signal (a combination of speed and altitude). Therefore the method is 
essentially relying on the differencing of these two signals to eliminate the Phugoid to 
result in a steady AOA response.  Numerical inconsistencies render this method largely 
useless during aggressive maneuvering.   
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2.1.2 Calculating Flight Path Angle 
In cases where the aircraft is climbing or descending, a reasonable approximation of the 
flight path angle must be calculated. This can be obtained either from air data 
measurements or from inertial measurements providing a decent wind approximation is 
available.  If wind measurements are available the flight path angle can easily be 
determined from basic trigonometry, where vV  is the vertical speed of the aircraft, and aV
is the true airspeed of the aircraft as measured along the flight path. 
1sin va
a
V
V
 
 
  
 
 (2.2) 
However, it is likely that if angle of attack data is compromised, it may be that other air 
data is also compromised, so a method of determining flight path angle from inertial or 
navigational data is desired.  In most cases inertial data can give the groundspeed and 
ground track of the aircraft as well as the vertical speed of the aircraft with respect to the 
inertial frame.  These measurements are of course inertial, and therefore not measured 
with respect to the air-mass.  Furthermore, the ground-speed represents the horizontal 
speed of the aircraft, not the speed of the aircraft along its flight path.  To estimate the air 
data from the inertial data an estimate of the winds is needed.  Often this is available to 
the aircraft either from a datalink, or due to prior on-board calculations when both air-
data and inertial data were available.  Generally the conversion is as simple as subtracting 
the wind component from the ground speed as shown in Equation (2.3).  Equation (2.3) 
shows an implicit vector subtraction of the respective velocities.  The format of the wind 
data on the aircraft will determine the exact formulation needed. There is likely no good 
way to account for vertical gusts. 
a g wV V V    (2.3) 
Since the groundspeed is a horizontal measurement rather than the total measure, the 
flight path angle is slightly different, as shown in Equation (2.4). A subscript ‘h’ is added 
to the true airspeed term to denote it is a horizontal measurement.  In most cases this 
distinction matters very little to the overall speed because the cosine of angles in the 
normal range for flight path angle are very nearly unity (i.e., a ahV V ) and either 
Equation (2.2) or (2.4) will suffice. 
1tan va
ah
V
V
 
 
  
 
 (2.4) 
In modern aircraft inertial or navigation data is usually quite good.  Modern GPS systems 
in the United States and Canada make use of the Wide Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS) which improves the accuracy of the GPS signals. The WAAS specification 
requires it to provide a position accuracy of 25ft or less (for both lateral and vertical 
measurements), at least 95% of the time. Actual performance measurements of the 
system at specific locations have shown it typically provides better than 5ft in most parts 
of North America. With these results, WAAS is capable of providing the data needed to 
approximate air-data. 
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2.1.3 Maneuvering Flight 
In maneuvering flight, the calculation of flight path angle requires a more thorough 
estimate of angle of attack beyond what is provided in Equation (2.1). The formal 
definition of flight path angle is shown in Equation (2.5).2 The nomenclature Cθ and S
θare simplified notation for cosθ and sin θ.  This is done for all trigonometric
manipulations to simplify the ultimate expression. 
(2.5) 
Equation (2.5) must be rearranged in terms of a  to solve for .  Due to the 
transcendental functions, it can only be done approximately, however a numerical solver 
could be used to solve it exactly if needed.  First, it will be assumed that the sideslip 
angle of the aircraft,  , is small.  This eliminates several terms. Unfortunately, this 
leaves the expression still in terms of both the sine and cosine of  , so another 
simplification is made.  Since the cosine of small angles is nearly unity, the cosine of   
is assumed to be one.  The cosine of 15
o
is 0.965, which is an AOA value that the aircraft 
is unlikely to exceed in normal flight.  The Euler angles  and  are known and therefore 
constant for this calculation. 
  1sina C S C S C        (2.6) 
 sin a S C C S      (2.7) 
1sin a
S S
C C
 
 
 
 
   
 
  (2.8) 
2.2 Estimating AOA Using Vertical Acceleration 
The vertical acceleration of the aircraft, zn , often can be used as a direct stand-in for 
angle of attack since zn tracks angle of attack closely.  The vertical acceleration is a 
function of the lift of the aircraft divided by its mass.  In steady level flight, when the 
vertical acceleration is pointed down and the lift vector is mostly pointed up, the 
relationship is straightforward as shown in Equation (2.9).  
 
ow L Lw L
z
qS C CqS CL
n
mg mg mg


   (2.9) 
The dynamic pressure is defined as follows: 
2  Aircraft equations of motion can be found in reference texts such as: Etkin, Bernard, and Lloyd D. Reid. Dynamics of Flight: 
Stability and Control. New York: Wiley, 1996. Print. 
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21
2 a
q V  (2.10) 
Based on Equation (2.9), for a given combination of weight, altitude, and airspeed, zn
varies linearly with  .  (see Equation (2.11) and (2.12)) 
ow L w L
z
qS C qS C
n
mg mg
    (2.11) 
ow L
z
w L
qS C
n
mg
qS C
mg



 (2.12) 
Using zn  to approximate angle of attack requires considerable information about the 
aircraft, including the altitude, the airspeed, its current weight, and some basic lift curve 
information. Also, it is the most sensitive to errors in the airspeed measurement due to the 
squaring of speed in the dynamic pressure term. However, it will be the most accurate for 
capturing the dynamic response of the signal, and it will work during maneuvering. 
Furthermore, it is just a linear approximation, and may not yield perfect answers in the 
upper ranges of the alpha curve.  However, its primary advantage is the response speed.  
2.3 Estimating AOA Based on Elevator Deflection 
For a given aircraft configuration, including flap position, gear position, center of gravity, 
etc.., there is generally a fixed theoretical relationship between the elevator deflection (or 
other pitch controlling device) and the angle of attack. This relationship can be seen in 
the non-dimensionalized pitching moment Equation (2.13), where e is the elevator 
deflection. In a steady state condition the pitching moment is zero, (i.e. 0.0)mC  and the 
unsteady terms (i.e. , q ) are small.  This leaves Equation (2.14) which can be rearranged 
to solve for  (Equation (2.15). 
0 2 2 q e
w w
m m m m m m e
o o
c c
C C C C C q C
u u  
       (2.13) 
0
0
e
m m m eC C C      (2.14) 
 
0 e
m m e
m
C C
C




 
 (2.15) 
This is a truly interesting result because it suggests that the angle of attack can be 
determined directly without any information about the aircraft state. All dimensional 
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terms drop out and all inertial measurements are irrelevant. The disadvantage however is 
that the estimate is only valid for smooth air.  Any external disturbance that creates a shift 
in angle of attack, would not be predicted by elevator deflection. However, the estimate 
gives a really good estimate of what the steady state angle of attack should be.   This 
estimate should be used with discretion.  For instance, if no alpha response is observed 
with the deflection of the elevator, the alpha senor (or elevator) should be considered 
suspect. Furthermore, the signal should never be considered as a substitute for any signal 
being used in a feedback control capacity, because it doesn’t contain any real information 
about the aircraft dynamics.  It is only good as a reference estimate. 
Implicit in this approximation is that the dynamics between elevator and angle of attack is 
instantaneous.  As will be demonstrated in Section 3, the dynamics are governed by the 
short period. During high frequency manipulation of the controls, this results in a lag 
between this approximation and the AOA signal.  To make up for this lag, a simple first 
order lag is added to the AOA approximation, where c is the calculated value from 
Equation (2.15), and l is the lagged output. 
1
1
l c
s
 



   (2.16) 
3 Modal Properties Analysis 
The modal properties of the aircraft dynamics impact how various measurement signals 
should be expected to respond.  This information can be used to determine whether a 
particular signal is correct or faulty.   
3.1 Longitudinal Modes 
There are two second order (oscillatory) modes that describe the longitudinal dynamics of 
a fixed wing aircraft. The two modes are typical of the control-fixed longitudinal 
characteristics of stable airplanes over a wide range of conditions.3 It is beyond the scope 
of this effort to provide a detailed mathematical development of these modes, however a 
brief discussion of the modes and the relevance to our analysis are provided below. 
3.1.1 Short Period 
The short period mode is named because it is the faster of the two modes.  It is the mode 
which defines the aircraft’s pitching about its center of gravity (see Figure 3.1).  
Generally, the short period mode is over ten times faster than the other longitudinal 
mode. The short period mode controls the dynamics between elevator deflection and the 
aircraft’s angle of attack.  The behavior of the angle of attack is dominated by the short 
period mode.  Similarly, the zn signal, since it is largely a function of angle of attack, 
mostly reflects the short period dynamics. 
3 Etkin, Bernard, and Lloyd D. Reid. Dynamics of Flight: Stability and Control. New York: Wiley, 1996. Print. 
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Figure 3.1. Illustration of Short Period Dynamics 
3.1.2 Phugoid 
The Phugoid mode is the slower of the two longitudinal modes.  The Phugoid reflects a 
gradual interchange between potential and kinetic energy about the equilibrium altitude 
and airspeed (see Figure 3.2).  The Phugoid mode is characterized by changes in pitch 
attitude, altitude, and velocity at a nearly constant angle of attack.  The Phugoid will have 
a strong influence over the behavior of the pitch angle, but is nearly non-existent in the 
angle of attack.  In fact, pitch angle is influenced by both dynamic modes, so the transient 
response from each mode can be observed in pitch signals.  
Figure 3.2. Illustration of Phugoid Dynamics 
3.2 Simulation Examples 
Using a desktop simulation (described in Section 6), example data tracks were developed 
to demonstrate the impact of these dynamic modes on the aircraft state. Figure 3.3 shows 
the excitement of the Phugoid dynamics with an elevator doublet.  The Figure shows a 
single elevator doublet in the first 5 seconds of the signal.  This doublet immediately 
causes a response in AOA, zN , and pitch. Both the AOA and zN response to the elevator 
doublet are governed by the short period.  The response is nearly immediate, with an 
overshoot prior to returning to an equilibrium value. After the initial transient decays, 
both AOA and  zN  remain relatively stable, however the pitch signal shows a slower, 
more pronounced oscillation. This oscillation, the Phugoid, shows that the pitch is 
governed nearly equally by both of the longitudinal modes, essentially acting together. 
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 Figure 3.3. Phugoid excitement after single elevator doublet 
The important conclusion is that from a dynamic response, while both pitch and AOA 
respond to elevator deflections, pitch angle generally cannot serve as a good surrogate for 
AOA, whereas, the zN signal, governed much more exclusively by the short period, can 
serve as a stand-in for AOA.  Notice also that airspeed and altitude are dominated by the 
Phugoid mode, and show nearly no short period response.  The conclusion is that AOA 
and zN  responses are dominated by the short period, speed and altitude are dominated by 
the Phugoid, and the pitch angle is influenced by both modes.  This phugoid influence 
illustrates the difficulty of using pitch information to reconstruct AOA.  
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Figure 3.4. Speed change in level flight under autopilot control 
Figure 3.4 shows a constrained response where the autopilot is used to facilitate a speed 
change from 100 KIAS to 70 KIAS (the plot shows speed in ft/sec true airspeed). In this 
case, where the aircraft is in level flight, both the Phugoid and short period mode are 
completely damped out of the system by autopilot inputs. In this case, pitch serves as a 
good surrogate for AOA.  In fact it should equal AOA exactly.   
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Figure 3.5. Aggressive Pitch Maneuvering 
Also note that the zN  response is level, showing that for equilibrium conditions, it makes 
a poor surrogate for AOA.  The elevator deflection tracks the AOA very well. In cases 
where the short period is sufficiently faster than the commanded input, the AOA response 
to elevator appears instantaneous.  In steady conditions, both elevator4 and pitch can be 
used to estimate AOA.  Figure 3.5 shows more dramatic longitudinal maneuvering to 
further highlight the short period response in the signals.  The response shows how 
closely AOA will track the elevator.  The AOA will lag elevator, showing that a better 
4 In flight mechanics nomenclature ‘up-elevator’ from a pilot’s perspective is denoted as negative to maintain a consistent sign 
convention 
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approximation for AOA is obtained by the elevator response fed through a 1st order lag.  
The lag doesn’t capture the overshoot of the second order short period, but it will tend to 
improve peak alignment.  
4 Signal Comparison 
From the modal property analysis of the prior section, it can be seen that each method 
may have its individual strengths.  The pitch signal is good for determining angle of 
attack exactly, but it is only valid in steady level flight.  The zn  signal is good for 
determining if the AOA signal properly reflects the dynamics of the short period, but 
otherwise doesn’t directly enable any value-by-value comparison.  
4.1 Signal Similarity 
The fact that zn is similar to AOA in terms of its dynamic properties, but differs by some 
unknown (difficult to calculate) linear relationship, led to the conclusion that perhaps 
signal similarity techniques could be employed between the two signals, which would 
forgo the need for sophisticated processing using other state data.  Two methods were 
tried.  The first was a traditional method based on the convolution of a sampled part of 
the signal.  This worked well in a static Matlab environment, but did not perform well in 
the simulation.  The main problem is that the short period dynamics just are not observed 
often enough to make the comparison.  Most of the flight trajectory is smooth as observed 
in Figure 3.4.  For the convolution algorithm to work reliably, the signal would have to 
possess dynamic properties more like those in Figure 3.5. Indeed, the algorithm did work 
when the operator continuously cycled the elevator. Another attempt was made to 
develop an ad-hoc method that would identify the peaks of signals based on the 
derivative of the respective signals.  This method worked reasonably well, but small 
minority of peaks were missed, which led to some false positives.  And the main problem 
still remained, that if there was not sufficient short period excitement, the algorithm could 
not render an opinion. 
Therefore, for comparison, a simple value-by-value comparison was employed.  A 
moving average of the signal errors was maintained, and if a mean signal error exceeded 
a specified tolerance, the signal was rejected.  This method worked adequately well, but 
also meant that for zn , accurate representations of the linear relationship between AOA 
and zn  needed to be maintained. 
4.2 Moving Average 
The moving average method was based on a simple moving average of the value-by-
value difference between the measured signal mf and reference signal rf , where the 
measured signal represents the data from the sensor, and the reference signal represents 
the approximation to the signal from one of the methods from section 2. The relationship 
is shown in Equation (4.1).  The term k indicates the location in the main sample. The 
moving average considers the prior m points.  If the error kE exceeds a tolerance, the 
signal is considered to have failed. 
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A typical error tolerance used in the simulation was 0.5 deg. 
5 Signal Comparison Algorithms 
The overall algorithm consists of a series of signal comparators that work together to 
determine which of the three AOA sensor signals is accurate.  There are five different 
comparators.  The first is the traditional simple voting comparator, which just differences 
the three input signals and looks for an outlier signal.  Then there are four special signal 
comparators that compare each sensor signal to a calculated reference signal.  The 
comparators are named for the primary contributing input to its respective reference 
signal.  
1. Simple Voting
2. Pitch-Based Comparator
3. FPA-Based Comparator
4. Nz-Comparator
5. Elevator-Comparator
Each comparator, has limits placed on its availability for use, based on the state of the 
aircraft. These limits are referred to as the operating envelope of the comparator, and 
reflects the boundaries outside of which, the comparator cannot produce an accurate 
assessment.  The comparator operating envelopes are shown below: 
1. Simple Voting    (No envelope limits)
2. Pitch-Based Comparator   (Vertical Speed +/- 250 ft/min,  +/- 5 deg)
3. FPA-Based Comparator    (Vertical Speed +/- 1000 ft/min,  +/- 20 deg)
4. Nz-Comparator   (Vertical Speed +/- 5000 ft/min,  +/- 90 deg) 
5. Elevator-Comparator   (Vertical Speed +/- 5000 ft/min,  +/- 90 deg) 
The pitch and FPA comparators are essentially the same comparator, using the measured 
pitch and approximated flight path angle in conjunction to estimate AOA. A distinction is 
made between them based on operating envelope.  Since steady level conditions can yield 
an exact figure for AOA using the FPA method, under very steady conditions the FPA 
comparator essentially gets two votes.  
The limits are of most concern for the FPA-based algorithms, which are the most 
accurate, but also the most susceptible to error. Deviations from level flight can lead to 
large errors in the reference approximation signal.  For the Nz and elevator systems, 
limits are established, but they are arbitrary.  It is not clear what limits, if any, are needed. 
Figure 5.1 shows the basic algorithm.  Each comparator is provided with the three AOA 
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signals, and performs an evaluation of the signal validity based on the respective 
reference signal associated with the particular comparator.   
Triple Redundant AOA Signals
Alpha 1
Alpha 2
Alpha 3
PITCH
COMPARATOR
Nz
COMPARATOR
FPA
COMPARATOR
Elevator
COMPARATORVOTING
COMPARATOR
TRUSTED
SIGNAL
SIGNAL STATUS VECTORS
[X1 x2 x3] [X1 x2 x3] [X1 x2 x3] [X1 x2 x3] [X1 x2 x3]
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3
a zsum Vote n e
x x x x x x
x x x x x x
x x x x x x
  
           
               
           
                      
RESOLVER
Figure 5.1. Algorithm for resolving triple redundant AOA signals 
The resolver evaluates the signals from each of the comparators and determines the signal 
most likely to be correct. For now, the resolver sums the result from each of the 
comparators (see Equation (5.1)).  In the ideal scenario, where all sensors are operating 
perfectly, or when a single sensor failure is encountered, all the comparators should agree 
with the basic voting comparator on which signals are valid.  In the case where the voting 
comparator has simultaneous failed signals that present nearly the same value and hence 
rejects the one likely correct value, the 4 reference-based comparators will be able to 
override the voting algorithm. It may be desirable to establish a minimum score any that 
signal must achieve to be believable. In the case that where all three sensors fail, the 
minimum score would prevent the resolver from returning a good evaluation to a signal 
just because it is the ‘best’ of the failed signals. 
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3
a zsum Vote n e
x x x x x x
x x x x x x
x x x x x x
  
           
               
           
                      
(5.1) 
6 Desktop Simulation 
The aircraft simulation used for the research is a 6 DOF (Degree of Freedom) research 
simulation originally developed to test handling characteristics of light aircraft.  The 
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aircraft model is of a Ryan Navion, which is a light civil aircraft capable of roughly 
150kts. The model is capable of supporting any type of aircraft, if the proper data is 
available. Due to constraints on scope of this current effort, the Navion model was used 
rather than modifying the simulation to a high-speed civil transport.  
6.1 Main Interface 
The main interface enables the operator to start and pause the simulation. An image of the 
interface is shown in Figure 6.1.  The simulation time is established when the simulation 
is first started.  The start-pause button is a toggle button that toggles the operation of the 
simulation.  It initially starts the simulation and will pause it at any time during operation.  
The main interface window shows three times.  The first is the simulation time.  This 
time represents the time since the first initialization. It is based on original clock time 
when the simulation was initialized plus all the time that the simulation has run.  The 
middle time is the simulation time with an offset added to correspond with the current 
clock time. It is normal for the simulation to have an offset between clock time and 
simulator time, especially after numerous start-pause cycles. The third time is the current 
computer clock time.  The simulation is maintaining a proper frame rate (maintaining 
real-time operations) when the offset time and the clock time are identical.  The 
simulation will provide a warning if the simulation breaks a frame, and the soft-real time 
executive will attempt to make up the lost time on successive frames.  The main interface 
also allows the simulation to record data in a ‘.CSV’ (comma separated format), that can 
easily be imported into other tools.  Pressing the ‘Record Data’ button starts the process, 
and the button will turn orange while data is being recorded.  Toggling the button starts 
and stops data collection. 
Figure 6.1. Main interface controls the operation of the simulation and allows the use to record data 
Stopping and restarting the data recording function without changing the file name will 
cause the system to overwrite the data in the file, so it is important to keep track of the 
filenames in use. Table 6-1 shows the data collected in the data file. 
Table 6-1.  Description and of data members collected in data files 
Value Units Description 
t seconds Simulation Time 
e degrees Elevator Deflection 
  degrees Angle of Attack (truth) 
zn g Vertical Acceleration (body frame) 
  degrees Pitch Angle 
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Value Units Description 
  degrees Roll Angle 
1s degrees Angle of Attack Sensor Model 1 
2s degrees Angle of Attack Sensor Model 2 
3s degrees Angle of Attack Sensor Model 3 
IASV ft per sec Indicated Airspeed / Calibrated Airspeed 
h ft Altitude 
TASV ft per sec True Airspeed 
f degrees Fused angle of attack from sensors 
GSV knots Ground speed 
h ft per min Vertical Speed 
FPAr
 degrees Angle Of Attack Reference Signal from FPA method 
nzr
 degrees Angle Of Attack Reference Signal from Nz method 
er
 degrees Angle Of Attack Reference Signal from e  method 
6.2 Control Surface Window 
The control surface window is shown in Figure 6.2. The control surface window indicates 
the position of the control surfaces and shows their motion in real time. The control 
surface pointers on the left cannot be used to fly the aircraft. They are strictly position 
indicators.  A joystick is required to manipulate the control surfaces directly. On the right 
side of the screen, there is a longitudinal trim control and a throttle control.  These 
elements can be manipulated by a mouse to control the inputs.  The longitudinal trim can 
also be manipulated by the point of view control that is on most modern joysticks. 
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Figure 6.2. The Control Surface window gives a real-time display of control surface and throttle position 
6.3 Mode Control Panel 
The Mode Control Panel is shown in Figure 6.3. The mode control panel is the primary 
interface for the autopilot. The autopilot functions similarly to an air-transport system. 
The white knobs allow the value in the settings window to be changed.  Clicking on the 
right side of the knob increments the value up and the left side increments the value 
down. Engaging a button enables a particular mode. A green indicator light illuminates 
when a mode has been activated.  For the vertical speed dial, clicking in the uppermost 
part causes a reduction in vertical speed, and clicking in the lower part causes an increase 
in vertical speed.   
Figure 6.3.  The Mode Control Panel controls autopilot functionality 
HDG button. The HDG (Heading) button engages the heading capture mode. The 
aircraft will turn towards the selected heading using a standard rate turn and capture the 
heading. 
HLD button. Selecting the HLD (Hold) button will engage altitude hold, which will 
command the aircraft to capture the current altitude (not the altitude displayed in the 
window, which is used for altitude capture purposes). 
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VS button. Engaging the VS (Vertical Speed) button will command the aircraft to climb 
or descend at the prescribed vertical speed in the Vertical Speed window. The aircraft 
will climb/descend towards the altitude displayed in the altitude capture window. At the 
appropriate time, the autopilot will transition to altitude hold and capture the altitude in 
the adjacent window.  
FLC button. Engaging the FLC (Flight Level Change) button will command the aircraft 
to climb or descend at the prescribed indicated airspeed in the speed window. The aircraft 
will climb/descend towards the capture altitude displayed in the altitude capture window. 
At the appropriate time, the autopilot will transition to altitude hold and capture the 
altitude in the adjacent window. 
SPD button. Selecting the SPD (Speed) button will engage speed capture, which will 
command the aircraft to capture the speed shown in the speed window.  
6.4 Flight Instruments Window 
The Flight Instruments window is shown in Figure 6.4. Instrument window includes the 
Standard-6 instruments as well as a power level indicator and a true airspeed indicator.  
The indicators give the ability for the operator to view the aircraft behavior from a pilot’s 
perspective. The vertical speed indicator show instantaneous vertical speed rather than 
the heavily lagged vertical speed that would normally be seen when using a traditional 
VSI (Vertical Speed Indicator) instrument.  The ground-speed function has not been 
enabled, so the Ground Speed indicator will read true airspeed.  
Figure 6.4. Traditional flight instruments provide a pilots view of the aircraft state 
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6.5 Alpha Sensor Control Panel 
For this project, a simplified alpha sensor modeling capability was developed. The Sensor 
model is based on a 1st order Gauss Markov process which uses truth data as the primary 
input and then allows the operator to vary the standard deviation of the noise (sigma) and 
also to add a bias to the signal.  The maximum standard deviation is 5.0 degrees (the 
display does not show the decimal point) and the bias can be (+/- 5.0 degrees). The 
damping ratio of the Gauss Markov process is fixed at 0.5. Three instances of the sensor 
models included in the simulation to model the three redundant sensors that are present 
on most high assurance systems. The Alpha Sensor Control Panel (Figure 6.5) gives the 
operator control over the behavior of each of the sensors, and can control the bias and 
noise standard deviation independently.  A freeze toggle button also allows the operator 
to freeze a signal (and to subsequently unfreeze it). The control panel allows the operator 
to test the functionality of the comparators under various circumstances very quickly. 
Figure 6.5. The Alpha Noise/Bias window enables the operator to control the error properties of the Alpha 
Sensors  
6.6 Comparator Window 
A comparator window (Figure 6.6) was developed to indicate the status of all three 
simulated alpha-sensors, when compared to the reference values associated with each of 
the reference comparators.  The five reference comparators as discussed in Section 5 are 
shown in the window.  For each comparator, there is an indicator light that illuminates 
either green when a signal is perceived to be good, amber if the signal is perceived to be 
bad, or off (grey) if the comparator cannot render a judgement based on the current 
aircraft state.  A final resolver shows the overall best estimate of the alpha sensor status. 
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Figure 6.6. The Comparator window shows the status of the Alpha signals 
6.7 Stripcharts 
The simulation is configured to have three strip-chart windows that enable monitoring of 
simulation data in real-time. Currently there are two windows with six charts each and 
one single chart window for comparator signals. 
 One strip chart window shows the primary longitudinal states, which are: Elevator
Deflection, AOA, zN , Pitch, Airspeed, and Altitude. 
 A second strip chart window shows the three AOA sensor models, a fused version
of AOA from the voting algorithm (average of all good sources), and the truth
AOA.
 The comparator strip-chart has four angle of attack estimates plotted on the same
chart. These lines are as follows: Truth AOA (yellow), FPA estimate (Orange),
Elevator Estimate (red), and the zN  Estimate (green). 
7 Example Simulation Results 
This section provides a summary of the results obtained during the simulation. 
 Three charts are shown that indicate the performance of the reference signals.
 Each chart shows elevator deflection followed by the ‘truth’ AOA.
 Then each of the reference signals are presented on their own respective graphs.
 Finally, a single chart is shown with both truth AOA and the 3 reference signals.
Overall, the simulation results show that the Nz solution is the most reliable in all cases. 
While it may not always be the most numerically precise, it can be expected to reliably 
track the AOA signal in most all maneuvers. Therefore, the Nz solution, notwithstanding 
the additional data needed to calculate it, may be the best method overall for reliably 
checking AOA.   
Figure 7.1 shows the aircraft in a gentle speed reduction from 100 KIAS to 70 KIAS.  In 
this case all of the reference signals are nearly identical to the actual angle of attack. This 
plot demonstrates that during gradual maneuvers in non-turning flight, all of the reference 
signals can be expected to provide good results. 
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Figure 7.1.  AOA Reference signals during a speed reduction 
Figure 7.2  shows the aircraft in a 180 degree turn in level flight at 100 KIAS.  The 
aircraft starts in level flight and then establishes a 30 degree bank angle for the turn. At 
the end of the turn, the aircraft reduces its bank angle and captures the new heading. The 
maneuver shows the increase in angle of attack needed to maintain level flight in the 30 
degree bank.  It also shows that during the establishment of the bank angle, the FPA 
reference solution shows some unsteady behavior. This unsteady behavior is largely 
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reduced when the bank angle stabilizes at 30 deg suggesting that the bank rate has more 
impact on FPA-reference unreliability than the bank angle itself.  It is not clear why this 
is the case and will require further research to fully understand. The elevator signal shows 
some bias in the signal more so during the turn than during level flight, but it amounts to 
only about 0.25 degree.  The reason for the bias may be due to the omission of unsteady 
terms, which may have a greater contribution in the turn.  Further study is required to 
understand the observation.  Overall, the Nz reference signal tracks the entire maneuver 
the most reliably.   
Figure 7.2.  AOA Reference signals during a 180 degree turn 
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Figure 7.3 shows the reference signals subjected to multiple elevator doublets while in 
level flight.  Here all the signals track the actual AOA quite well with the exception of the 
elevator reference.  This is to be expected.  Since the elevator reference AOA is just a 
scaled and lagged elevator signal, the short period dynamics that characterize the 
de/AOA relationship are missing.  Therefore the overshoot that is seen in the other 
signals in the lower portion of the sinusoids is missing in the elevator signal.  It 
emphasizes that the elevator reference signal can estimate a steady-state value but is not 
good at capturing the dynamics of higher-frequency maneuvering.  
Figure 7.3.  AOA Reference signals during elevator doublets 
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8 Conclusions 
In this effort a basic set of reference signals, which can be assembled from aircraft state 
information, were constructed to demonstrate how AOA can be estimated when the 
actual sensor AOA data is not reliable. Three signals using independent methods were 
developed: The FPA reference solution, the Nz reference solution, and the elevator 
reference solution. Overall, the Nz reference solution proved the most reliable for 
capturing both steady-state and higher-frequency maneuvering. The FPA reference 
solution works well in level flight, but loses precision in turns especially when the bank 
rate is high. The elevator reference solution gives a reasonable approximation for steady 
state AOA values, but cannot reproduce the dynamics associated with the short period. 
Therefore, it is inadequate for any high-frequency operations. 
This work is a first step in determining methods for evaluating failed states. This work 
provides a proof-of-concept demonstration performed with limited resources. The work 
does demonstrate concept viability and illustrates some basic concepts that must be 
understood when making such calculations. Further research is recommended in the 
following areas: 
 Expanded Scope: The scope of this effort was to focus on angle of attack
exclusively, because it is perhaps the most vulnerable sensor measurements to
atmospheric contamination or damage. However all aircraft states ideally would
have some means of reference based validation.  It would be good to expand the
scope of the project to include all air data.
 More Sophisticated Analysis: The mechanisms presented in this effort represent
the simplest methods by which an angle-of-attack reference signal could be
created.  More sophisticated methods should be considered, such as methods
involving some combination of State Observers and Kalman Filtering.
 Error and Uncertainty Analysis: With the current analysis, each reference
signal has been created using ideal inputs without any errors. A rigorous analysis
of available data is needed to determine the likely noise and error properties of
input signals, as well as the likely error bounds of the reference signals.
 Aircraft Performance: The current analysis was performed on a low subsonic
aircraft model. While the basic physics of aircraft dynamics is the same for all
fixed wing aircraft, it would be best if the aircraft model more accurately reflected
the target aircraft class: the high-speed civil transport aircraft. The performance
differences may impact the error analysis and identify specific anomalies that
aren’t present with low speed aircraft.
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